INTRODUCTION
Judicial decisions of the international tribunals have always been treated as a subsidiary source of law. The rulings are not binding upon States, apart from the parties to particular proceedings, but their prominence is so high that many judgements are treated as a reflection of international law. It is even more so with the rules of customary international law, and courts' rulings either confirm the existence of a particular rule and its content, or influence the future practice of States and international organisations so that it becomes one. 1 As Prof Karol Wolfke wrote in his well-known book Custom in Present International Law: 'their informal share in the development of international customary law is undoubtedly considerable'. 2 Customary international law was also an important source of law for ad hoc international criminal courts: for Rwanda 3 (the ICTR) and former Yugoslavia 4 (the ICTY). Both tribunals found there grounds for both jurisdiction and sentencing. The criminal tribunals were authorised to apply enumerated norms of international law, but because there were uncertainties as to the substance and the binding force of treaties at the time when the crimes were committed, the application of the rules of customary international law has to be determined 'beyond any doubt'. 5 The object of this article is to describe how two ad hoc international criminal tribunals dealt with the issue of following and explaining norms of customary international law. In order to do that the representative decisions and judgments of international criminal courts are citied and examined. The first part is a description of the sources of law for criminal tribunals, with emphasis on the international custom. The second consists of the analysis of the international criminal courts' approach to the two-element theory of customary international law. It is followed with an enquiry into the content of customary international law: concerning both jurisdiction and substance of customary international law. The article ends with conclusions.
I. SOURCES OF LAW FOR CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
There are two main sources in international law: treaties and custom. According to art. 38 para 1 (b) of the Statute, the ICJ shall apply 'international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law'. 6 For centuries those international norms were only binding upon States, not individuals. That rule was contested after World War I and from that time there are more and more cases where individuals have been held legally responsible directly before international organs based on international norms. One may argue that the establishing of the described criminal courts cements that liability.
On the other hand, in most internal criminal justice systems an individual may be convicted of a crime that is known and penalised only before it was committed. The concept derives from the basic norm of nullum crimen nulla poene sine lege, which is of utmost importance in contemporary societies. Therefore, one of the biggest challenges before ad hoc criminal tribunals has been to ascertain their jurisdiction to punish individuals for particular crimes. According to Judge Meron '[i]f a criminal conviction for violating uncodified customary law is to be reconciled with this principle (...) it must be through the use of clear and well-established methods of indenting customary law. The legality principle this serves as a restraint on the tribunals' ability to be 'progressive' in their contribution to the development of the customary international law.' 7 The criminal tribunals were authorised to judge international crimes according to their statutes and international law. That is why, in cases where conventional law was lacking or could not be applied, they referred to international customary law. On that basis, the customary status of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, its Additional Protocols or the Genocide Convention have been confirmed. It was directly stated by the ICTY: '[i]n light of the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions, which is to guarantee the protection of certain fundamental values common to mankind in times of armed conflict, and of the customary nature of their provisions (…)'. 8 In the same judgments the Appeal Chamber stated that: "[i]t is indisputable that common Article 3, which sets forth a minimum core of mandatory rules, reflects the fundamental humanitarian
The above follows the reasoning line from the Tadić case, that norms arising from the Geneva Conventions constitute customary international law, and because of that their application by the ICTY does not violate the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. 10 Also, the ICTR confirmed that '[t]he Genocide Convention is undeniably considered part of customary international law, as can be seen in the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the provisions of the Genocide Convention, and as was recalled by the United Nations SecretaryGeneral in his Report on the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.'
11
Although none of the tribunals is bound by the precedent doctrine, as in the common law system, the certainty of criminal law encourages the consistency in its jurisprudence. The previous rulings are, however, treated as a secondary source. Therefore, even if chambers are not obligated to follow the decisions of others, in many cases they made reference to the already given decisions and refrained from describing the whole process which led to the conclusions. Only the decisions of the appeals chamber should be followed.
The above was confirmed by jurisprudence, as the ICTY explicitly said that the tribunal is not bound by previous doctrine, but 'must apply customary international law as it stood at the time of the offences.'
12 In another case, it was explained that the departure from the established line of reasoning should be done in the interests of justice in cases 'where the previous decision has been decided on the basis of a wrong legal principle or cases where a previous decision has been given per in curiam, that is a judicial decision that has been 'wrongly decided, usually because the judge or judges were ill-informed about the applicable law.'
13
Apart from its own decisions, the criminal tribunals referred to the decisions of the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo. Although their jurisprudence might have had only an evidentiary value for existing norms, in their decisions the ICTY and the ICTR took into account their conclusions which at the time were either declaratory or 'which had been gradually transformed into customary international law.' 14 However, as it was held by the ICTR that 'sometimes the jurisprudence of the International 9 Delalić (n 8) para 143 (emphasis added). 10 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a "Dule" (Judgement) IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997) para 577. One more remark could be added that it was observed that the criminal tribunals resorted to customary international law mostly in the first period of its works. Later on, more arise from the other sources.
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II. THE TWO-ELEMENT THEORY OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
According to the traditional approach, customary international law consists of two elements: State practice and opinion juris sive neccesitatis. The first is also known as the objective element -as all could observe actions of state or group of states, whereas the latter is of subjective character as it encompass the inner belief of state that it behaves in certain way because of legal obligation. The criminal courts, at least in theory, adhere to such a two element theory of international customary law.
It was clearly stated in Hadžihasanovic that 'to hold that a principle was part of customary international law, it has to be satisfied that State practice recognized the principle on the basis of supporting opinio juris.' 18 Tadić (n 17) para 131. 19 Tadić (n 17) para 132. 20 Tadić (n 17) para 121-122, see also para 83: the reflection of the ICTY to voice of USA as amicus curiae 'no gainsaying its significance: that statement articulates the legal views of one of the permanent members of the Security Council on a delicate legal issue; on this score it provides the first indication of a possible change in opinion juris of States'. 21 Tadić (n 17) para 97. 22 Tadić (n 17) para 108-109. Rarely do the tribunals specify which of the presented sources, in their opinion, are the reflection of the practice and which of opinion juris. 29 Moreover, the most frequently invoked source are judgements of international tribunals, which decided what is already established practice and may be treated as custom, and what is still just an attempt to introduce it as such.
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If one was to decide which of this evidence is most reliable in the eyes of the tribunals, one could point to the official pronouncements of States, military manuals and judicial decisions, as was observed by the ICTY:
"When attempting to ascertain State practice with a view to establishing the existence of a customary rule or a general principle, it is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the actual behaviour of the troops in the field (…) In appraising the formation of customary rules or general principles one should therefore be aware that, on account of the inherent nature of this subject-matter, reliance must primarily be placed on such elements as official pronouncements of States, military manuals and judicial decisions".
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The important conclusion that may be made from such an approach is that, for the tribunals, the official statements and presented attitude are more important than practice, as States do not always act according to their own pronouncements. 32 It may seem as an aberration from the notion of uniform and long-lasting practice, but actions are often contrary to what the State or individual know as a law.
Moreover, after the 17 th of July 1998 and adoption of the Rome Statute, the tribunals see it as a source of the opinion juris of States. For instance, while considering the crime of genocide the ICTY said that 'although that document post-dates the acts involved here, it has proved helpful in assessing the state of the customary international law which the Chamber itself derived from other sources.' 33 Later it adds that all States that took part in the Rome Conference could have shown their opinion and therefore '[f]rom this perspective, the documents is a useful key to the opinion juris of the States.' 34 Nevertheless, it should be underlined that the views expressed by the States during the conference were given in the particular situation concerning adoption of provisions pro future, not 27 Rwamakuba (n 15) para 14. 28 The tribunals present, rather, the traditional approach to customary international law. However, it does not mean that the tribunals always seek to confirm the validity of the customary norms by giving examples of State practice and/or opinion juris. Quite the contrary, in some cases they only state that certain conduct arises from customary law, without specifying the concrete situation. For instance in Kupreskić, it was indicated that '[i]n the light of the way States and courts have implemented it, this Clause [Martens] clearly shows that principles of international humanitarian law may emerge through a customary process under the pressure of the demands of humanity or the dictates of public conscience, even where State practice is scant or inconsistent. The other element, in the form of opinio necessitatis, crystallising as a result of the imperatives of humanity or public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive element heralding the emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law.' 35 The tribunal has not seen the need to find evidence for the existence of such a norm in the particular behaviour of States.
From tribunals' reasoning, it may be concluded that when there are equivalent norms in treaties and customary law it is sufficient to explain the similarities. The ICTR in the Mubasa case noted that provisions of Protocol II bound Rwanda both as a treaty law and international custom. 36 Therefore, the ICTR in this particular case as well in others, avoided prolonged deliberation in proving both elements of the customary norms. Such an approach of blending the sources of international law allowed tribunals to simplify and shorten the legal analysis.
37
Also inaction or lack of objection was, for tribunals, an indicator of the reflection of opinion juris. In Kupreskić the ICTY said that '[a]rticle 57 Additional Protocol I was now the part of customary international law, not only because it specified and fleshed out general pre-existing norms, but also because it did not appear to be contested by any State, including those who had not ratified the protocol.' 38 While examining the mutual interplay between custom and treaty, the tribunal has referred to Baxter paradox noting that, at times, it may be exceedingly difficult to ascertain both elements of custom -State practice and opinion juris, especially if earlier there had been a multilateral treaty adopted by the majority of the international community. It is because it is almost impossible to separate the State practice arising from the treaty norm from the customary obligations. To ascertain the existence of practice one would have to look at the practice of States that had not signed a particular treaty. 39 The best summary could be the own words of the ICTY that '[t]he International Tribunal is an ad hoc international court, established with a specific, limited jurisdiction. It is sui generis, with its own appellate structure.
35 Kupreskić (n 14) para 527. (…)The international community can only come to grips with the hydraheaded elusiveness of human conduct through a reasonable as well as a purposive interpretation of the existing provisions of international customary law.' 40 Therefore, one of the important aims of that tribunal is to ascertain and follow international customary norms in order to prosecute.
III. JURISDICTION OF THE CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
The principal aim of the international criminal courts were:
"to try crimes not of a purely domestic nature. They are really crimes which are universal in nature, well recognised in international law as serious breaches of international humanitarian law, and transcending the interest of any one State. (…). There can therefore be no objection to an international tribunal, properly constituted, trying these crimes on behalf of the international community".
41
Moreover, the important issue that was recognised by the ICTR is that it is not enough to determine that certain provisions of humanitarian law are part of customary international law, but that they are binding upon individuals. Therefore, along with the provisions of statutes providing individual criminal responsibility, "it must also be shown that an individual committing serious violations of these customary norms incurs, as a matter of custom, individual criminal responsibility thereby. Otherwise, it might be argued that these instruments only state norms applicable to States and Parties to a conflict, and that they do not create crimes for which individuals may be tried".
42
Until the establishing of tribunals, the general conclusion was that the States themselves punished such crimes under national legislations, so the perpetrators should be aware of that possibility. Also, there were many gaps left by the post-World War II jurisprudence. In order to perform their function, the best option of criminal tribunals was to fill these gaps by declaring some norms customary , even without further inquiry, which would have proven awkward. 43 Furthermore, the tribunals turned to the rules of customary law when prosecuting accused officials. In that scope the tribunals acknowledged the norm denying State officials who commit serious international crimes functional immunity. In Furundžija, the ICTY concluded that individuals are personally responsible, even if they are heads of State or government ministers, and a similar rule is expressly articulated in Article 7 (2) of its Statute and article 6 (2) of the Statute of the ICTR. 44 Also, in Blaškić the ICTY affirmed that '[t]he general rule under discussion is well established in 40 Delalić (n 28) para 170. 41 Tadić (1995) (n 17) para 42. 42 Akayesu (n 11) para 608. 43 Nevertheless, from the procedural point of view, the international criminal courts did not have clear rules how to proceed and thus tended to lean on national procedures. For example, the ICTY, when evaluating the statement of a witness of a sexual assault, concluded that 'there is no ground for concluding that this requirement of corroboration is any part of customary international law and should be required by this International Tribunal.' 46 The tribunal has come to such conclusions after comparing the practice and criminal procedure statutes of national courts, which allows judges the freedom of evaluation of evidence. It is an example that shows how norms widely recognised by national judicial system were used to prosecute on the international level.
It should be noted that the tribunals have tried to adhere to the norm of nullum crimen sine lege. so that individuals were punished only for crimes that were recognised at the time they were committed. In Delalić it was thus summarised: 'The majority of the Appeals Chamber did indeed recognise that a change in the customary law scope of the 'grave breaches regime' in this direction may be occurring. This Trial Chamber is also of the view that the possibility that customary law has developed the provisions of the Geneva Conventions since 1949 to constitute an extension of the system of "grave breaches" to internal armed conflicts should be recognised.' 47 The change was then recognised, but on the day of the trial, not that of committing the crime. The above judgments are the outcome of what Judge Meron describe as a 'blend' of two approaches: 'methodological conservatism' and 'outcome conservatism'. 48 According to his opinion it is 'the use of only firmly established, traditional methods to identify applicable customary norms' and application of basic principle in dubio pro reo.' 49 While summarizing the above part, it is worth noting that after many discussions, both tribunals concluded that there is no pre-established hierarchy and all crimes tried under its jurisdiction are serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
IV. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AS USED BY CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
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'Once it is satisfied that a certain act or set of acts is indeed criminal under customary international law, the Trial Chamber must satisfy itself that this offence with which the accused is charged was defined with sufficient clarity under customary international law for its general nature, its criminal character and its approximate gravity to have been sufficiently foreseeable and accessible.' 52 Only by complying with those conditions might it be said that the tribunals applied and preserved the nullum crime sine lege rule.
According to the Report of the UN Secretary General 'The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become part of international customary law is the law applicable in armed conflicts as According to statute of the ICTY it has a power 'to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law', 54 by which the statute expressly indicates grave breaches of Geneva Conventions of 1949, violation the laws or customs of war, genocide and responsibility for crimes. 55 Whereas the ICTR 'shall pronounce judgements and impose sentences and penalties on persons convicted of serious violations of international humanitarian law' 56 , for such crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol II. 57 What is more the Statute provides that a 'person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime' within the Tribunal's jurisdiction "shall be individually responsible for the crime.' 58 However, it was just the base on which the tribunals build their reasoning while trying to combine the real actions to the particular crimes. Moreover, all the terms listed above have not been defined, and this was a big field for the criminal tribunals for clarification. 51 It is not the aim of this article to present in detail all norms which were considered by the tribunals as customary, but to indicate on mechanism, which were used by the tribunals to ascertain their nature. 
Following that, the tribunals passed sentences for: (i) grave breaches of Geneva Conventions, violation the laws and customs of war, committing genocide and responsibility for crimes against humanity when committed in armed conflict; 59 (ii) rape and torture; 60 (iv) plunder; 61 (v) persecution and enslavement; 62 (vi) trench-digging and use of hostages and human shields, attacking cities, towns and villages, wanton destruction and plundering, destruction and damage of religious or educational institutions; 63 (vii) hate speech that expresses ethnic discrimination, advocacy of discrimination and incitement to violence. 64 The tribunals punish individuals who violated such norms personally, as commanders or by taking part in a joint criminal enterprise. 65 The ICTY also confirmed that it is a rule of customary international law that a crime against humanity may be committed for purely personal reasons. 66 The tribunals also analysed the question of the application of international humanitarian law to non-international conflicts. The ICTR confirmed that '[i]t is today clear that the norms of Common Article 3 have acquired the status of customary law in that most States, by their domestic penal codes, have criminalized acts which if committed during internal armed conflict, would constitute violations of Common Article 3.' 67 Moreover, in the Tadić case the ICTY set conditions that must be satisfied to fulfil the requirements of Article 3 of the Statute to include the regime of protection established under Common Article 3 applicable to armed conflicts not of an international character, which are:
(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law; (ii) the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required conditions must be met; (iii) the violation must be "serious", that is to say, it must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave consequences for the victim; and (iv) the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule.
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The four abovementioned requirements have been introduced by other chambers of the ICTY 69 and so the jurisprudence in that scope was fairly unified.
Basing on different facts of the cases, the tribunals have clarified many institutions of criminal international law, referring mostly to its customary status. It was so with the conception of aiding and abetting. 70 In Furundžija the tribunal chamber conducted the extensive analysis of the national case law as well as its own previous judgment. It came to the conclusion that the objective element of aiding and abetting is to provide assistance to a crime by making a substantial contribution (e.g. practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support) that has a substantial effect on its perpetration, even if the assistance itself would not amount to a criminal act. 71 Moreover, 'specific direction' is not an element of aiding and abetting liability under customary international law.' 72 The ICTY also found that it has jurisdiction over crimes committed as joint criminal enterprises. According to the chambers the liability for this has existed in the customary international law at least since 1992. 73 It was confirmed by the Appeal Chamber in Dordević that, according to the ICTY jurisprudence, the JCE applies to all crimes within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 74 In some respects the statutes of the tribunals go further than customary international rule, e.g. with the defence of following the order of a superior. According to the Nuremberg jurisprudence and case law following it, the courts should reject the notion of automatic exemption from criminal responsibility based on the superiors' order. However it was never fully established whether it is possible that, in certain circumstance, it might be applied (e.g. mistake to the law, duress). 75 Whereas the Statutes of both tribunals deny the superior order defence, it was openly stated in Erdenović, where the ICTY chamber found that 'duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings.' 76 The legacy of the ICTY is also the differentiation between deportation and forcible transfer in the customary international law. The first presumes transfer beyond State borders, whereas the latter means displacements within a State. 77 It was contested by some other trial chambers, as well as doctrine, but confirmed by the appeal chamber in the end. Nevertheless, the facts of the particular case as to whether a particular de facto border is sufficient to presume deportation, the case to case examination in the light of customary international law should be made. 78 In the Statić case, he was convicted for 79 There were many uncertainties concerning the actual state of law, as was the case with the definition of torture in the customary international law. In Delalić the ICTY invoked three different definitions of torture in different treaties in order to state that the representative of customary law is the definition in the Torture Convention of 1984. It was done without giving specific reasons why the tribunal treat that particular norm as resembling customary law, and others as only conventional. 80 Later the tribunal in Furundžija also confirmed that the prohibition of torture is binding both in times of peace as well as in times of armed conflict and that that this norm is addressed to individuals, too.
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CONCLUSIONS
The above analysis has shown that the application of the customary international law follows the tribunals' notion to observe the nullum crimem sine legem principle. It was directly stated in the Report of the SecretaryGeneral that 'the only reason behind the stated purpose of the drafters that the International Tribunal should apply customary international law was to avoid violating the principle of nullum crimen sine lege in the event that a party to the conflict did not adhere to a specific treaty.' 82 As it was, both tribunals referred to the customary norms as a source for their judgments, especially in the first few years after their establishment.
What is more, the ICTY and ICTR have not only described norms, but even when they did not apply one in particular case, their jurisprudence influenced the future practice. It could then be argued that the criminal tribunals have elevated many norms to the level of customary international law. 83 It was so with the tribunal's application of international humanitarian law in the internal conflict. Until the establishment of these two tribunals, the customary law position on individual criminal responsibility for serious violations of humanitarian law during internal armed conflicts, as in conventional law, were not considered to be criminal on the international plane. 84 The jurisprudence of criminal tribunals has changed that. On the other hand, the expanded customary international law was even used by the tribunals to expand their powers and jurisdiction in cases where there were doubts as to the binding force of the treaty law. Also, it was argued that the ICTY and the ICTR have expanded its role by being more liberal with interpretation of the norms of customary nature. Another charge made against tribunals is that their analyses of international customary law have been superficial and contributed to much to the blending of norms of customary and treaty character, so that the treaty mechanism of the conventional law may deteriorate. 85 Another issue is the formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which may diminish the role of the customary international law as a significant source of law. Nevertheless, even though the ICC has its own catalogue of sources, the legacy of the ad hoc criminal tribunals should not be ignored. It is because, although tribunals do not establish law, no one would deny its role in ascertaining specific norms, especially those of customary nature. It is also true for the jurisprudence of the two described criminal tribunals, to which a contribution to the application and clarification of customary international law cannot be denied. The ICTY and ICTR have, numerous times, invoked provisions of international humanitarian law emphasising that the content of those rules are part of customary international law. That is the legacy that will still be analysed in years to come. The future judgments would have to take into account the jurisprudence of the criminal tribunals, even if to contradict the previous conclusions.
Also, it should be underlined that the extensive jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals did not resolve all doubts concerning customary international law in the scope of armed conflicts and personal liability of perpetrators. There is still the vital issue that international criminal law lacks the sufficient precision in linking prohibition of certain acts with individual responsibility and sanction for its violation. 
